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Subsidiarity and a Free Society: The Subsidiary Role of the State in Catholic
Social Teaching
Abstract
One of the key principles of Catholic social thought is known as the principle of subsidiarity. This tenet
holds that nothing should be done by a larger and more complex organisation which can be done by a
smaller and simpler organisation. Subsidiarity, understood in this sense, is opposed to forms of
centralisation, bureaucratisation, and welfare assistance that deprive citizens of their own responsibility
toward themselves, their families, and their societies. Rather, subsidiarity supports personal
empowerment and responsibility as much as a proper balance between the public and private spheres,
with the resulting recognition of the common good that is inherently achieved through the spontaneous
interactions between free and responsible people. Hence, the subsidiarity principle is a bulwark of
freedom and it conflicts with all forms of collectivism. It sets the limits for state action.
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Subsidiarity and a Free Society: The Subsidiary Role of the State in Catholic Social
Teaching
Augusto Zimmerman
“The Principle of Subsidiarity is opposed to all forms of collectivism.
It sets the limits for state action”.
–Catechism of the Catholic Church, par. 1885.
I. Introduction
Subsidiarity is among the most characteristic directives of the Catholic Church’s social
doctrine. It has been present since the encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) by Pope Leo
XII. In general terms, the principle mandates that an obligation be imposed on higher
governing orders to help or assist lower orders to flourish or accomplish what cannot do
for themselves. Subsidiarity enhances the common good by securing the ‘dignity’ of
self-directing agents that ought to be free from arbitrariness or undue manipulation by
those who possess higher political or social powers. The principle stipulates that, in the
use of its legitimate authority, the state ought to be limited by a practical view of the
common good. Hence, subsidiarity is a principle that recognises the existence of certain
aspects of human life that are naturally ordained by God, and that the state may not
legitimately control or intervene.
II. Defining Subsidiarity
The word subsidiarity derives from the word subsidiary, which in turn has its roots in the
Latin word subsidium. Subsidiarity means ‘help’ or ‘assistance,’ implying that a higher
governing order has an obligation to help or assist individuals and lower social groups to
flourish, not to swamp or absorb them. As such, the subsidiarity principle is among the most
characteristic directives of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine. Indeed, subsidiarity not
only has been present since Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), but it was
enunciated by Pope Pius XI in 1931 as a core principle of Catholic social theory. In
Quadragesimo Anno, Pius IX outlined the principle as follows:
Just as it is gravely wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the
community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so, too, it is
an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and greater
organisation to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by
smaller and lower bodies. This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy,
unshaken and unchangeable. Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity
should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or
absorb them.1

1

Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Reconstructing the Social Order and Perfecting it Conformably to the
Precepts of the Gospel in Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Encyclical ‘Rerum Novarum’
(Australian Catholic Truth Society, 1931), 25. For a further discussion, see Robert K. Vischer, ‘Subsidiarity as a
Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution’ Indiana Law Review 34 (2001): 107–108. See also: Peter Widulski,
“Bakke, Grutter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 32 (2005): 847.
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The late Catholic political theorist Heinrich Rommen (1897-1967), discussing the relevant
language of Quadragesimo Anno, explains that ‘the principle of subsidiarity applies . . . to the
different natural or freely created communities in the social order. Social life is governed by
the principles of autonomy, of hierarchy and intervention.’2 With respect to the third
principle, intervention, Rommen contends that ‘[t]he purpose of this intervention is the
reconstruction of the order, the rehabilitation of the function, not the abolition of the part or
the substitution of the state for the lower society.’3 The concept therefore, may be fairly
described as a principle of competencies which derives its ontological traction from the fact
that subsidiary function is an important aspect of the common good.
Subsidiarity is about providing moral and practical functions to the lower orders that
are essential to a well-functioning community. It is also about placing rightful limits on
governmental action. That being so, the opposite of subsidiarity is analogous to an organic
state whereby a central government regulates and controls all aspects of our social life, thus
hindering personal freedom and prosperity. Subsidiarity is a principle to which Benedict XVI
returned time and again as he addressed a world that ever threatens to position the lone
individual against the Leviathan state: ‘When those responsible for the public good attune
themselves to the natural human desire for self-governance based on subsidiarity, they leave
space for individual responsibility and initiative, but most importantly, they leave space for
love (cf. Rom 13:8; Deus Caritas Est, 28), which always remains “the most excellent way”
(cf. 1 Cor 12:31).’4 In Caritas et Veritate (2009) Pope Benedict emphasised this particular
view of subsidiarity as,
an expression of inalienable human freedom. Subsidiarity is first and foremost a
form of assistance to the human person via the autonomy of intermediate bodies.
Such assistance is offered when individual or groups are unable to accomplish
something on their own, and it is always designed to achieve their emancipation,
because it fosters freedom and participation through assumption of responsibility.
Subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who
is always capable of giving something to others. By considering reciprocity as the
heart of what it is to be a human being, subsidiarity is the most effective antidote
against any form of all-encompassing welfare state. It is able to take account both
of the manifold articulation of plans – and therefore of the plurality of subjects –
as well as the coordination of those plans. Hence the principle of subsidiarity is
particularly well-suited to managing globalization and directing it towards
authentic human development.5
III. Subsidiarity in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas
According to John Haldane, two ideas have come to be associated with the concept of natural
law: ‘First, that of moral objectivity, as grounded in rationally discernible facts of nature,
facts concerning what is good or evil for rational animals; and, second, that of ethical
universality. Right or wrong in this account is not a matter of mere opinion or sentiment, nor
2

Heinrich Rommen, The State in Catholic Social Thought (St. Louis/MO: Herder, 1947), 302-3.
Ibid.
4
Pope Benedict XVI, “Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Participants in the 14 th Session of the
Pontifical Academic of Social Sciences”, Consistory Hall, Saturday, May 3, 2008, at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/may/documents/hf_benxvi_spe_20080503_social-sciences_en.html
5
Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical letter Caritas in veritate (2009) [57]
3
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is it a relative or local matter like custom’.6 On the contrary, ‘social customs and practices
may be, and often are, judged by reference to universal moral norms such as those of ‘natural
justice’.’7 These ideas ‘can be found in the developed forms in various philosophical writings
of the ancient Greeks, particularly those of Aristotle’.8
St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) provided a masterful integration of Christian
theology and Aristotelian philosophy, which ultimately proved to be a catalyst for the birth of
subsidiarity that, in time, would become a key principle of Catholic’s social thought.9 As
Haldane points out, ‘[a]nyone who knows anything about Aquinas knows that he effected an
extraordinary synthesis between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, and that he
is honoured as one of the greatest thinkers of the Roman Catholic Church’.10 And yet,
Aquinas was highly influenced by the philosophical writings of Aristotle not only in his
understanding of natural law theory, but also his idea that human societies naturally progress
from families, through villages to entire city-states. As noted by law professor Nicholas
Aroney,
[Aquinas] recognised that what Aristotle said of city-states could be applied not only
to cities but even more emphatically to political communities on the scale of
provinces, kingdoms and (perhaps even) empires. … [F]or Aquinas, the civil order
was not the only ‘perfect community’ in Aristotle’s sense: there was also the church
in all of its many grades and jurisdictions, alongside the many different religious
orders and fraternities of medieval Europe, some of them also organised into their
own graded hierarchies. Reflecting on the complexity of the society surrounding
him, Aquinas acknowledged the many and various purposes for which various
associations and forms of human community exist and are formed, giving rise to a
whole host of familial, geographical, professional, mercantile, scholarly and other
specialised societies. All of these groups and groupings, from the smallest to the
largest, have their place and their proper function, according to Aquinas, and each
should to be allowed to make its unique and special contribution as a means to
integral human fulfillment, without undue interference from any others, including
the state.11
The critical point for the birth of subsidiarity lay in a particular interpretation of Aristotle’s
political theory, and its adaptation to institutional pluralism – in particular a pluralistic view
that human society naturally progresses from families, through to villages, and then the
state.12 It is often forgotten that nation states are, themselves, political associations. In
Aristotle’s conception, the polis is not only composed of households and villages, it is
‘fundamentally comprised of individual citizens (politai), formed into a self-sufficing
unity’13. A student of Plato’s academy in Athens, Aristotle believed that humans are social

6

John Haldane, Faithful Reason: Essays Catholic and Philosophical (London/UK: Routledge, 2004), 130.
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Nicholas Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, in Global Perspectives on
Subsidiarity, eds. Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 15.
10
John Haldane, Reasonable Faith (London/UK: Routledge, 2010), 19.
11
Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 9.
12
Ibid., 9.
13
Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, p 14, quoting Aristotle (Politics, III.1). See
H. Jaffa, ‘Aristotle’, in History of Political Philosophy, eds. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey (2nd ed., Chicago/IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1972), 94-96, and compare Plato, Republic, II, 369a-c. On the composition of the
polis in terms of households and villages as well as individuals, see William L. Newman, Politics of Aristotle,
7
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beings (or ‘political animals’, as he put it) by nature, and that the family is an association
established by nature for the supply of daily needs. However, when people aim at something
bigger than the supply of their daily needs, they unite themselves in villages and eventually in
the state.14 Aristotle conceived the state as a natural development of our social impulses. In
this view, people exist as ‘social animals’. With no social organisation the individual is
nothing, since progress in human life is only possible through ‘participation in a society of
like-minded people’.15 Aristotle denied that the polis (i.e., the state) should properly replace
or supplant the smaller associations of which it is ultimately composed. Because he opposed
the ‘unification’ of the polis, the Platonic idea that the highest unity of the state is the highest
good was automatically rejected. Instead, Aristotle noticed that a plurality of societies is
ultimately desirable, and so the polis should not displace these smaller associations, including
the household. The state, the village and the household are all species of a broader
community, even though the state is uniquely the higher order of community and, of which,
the lesser communities are but ‘parts’.16
The underlining assumption in such a philosophical thinking is a conception of the
state as essentially a composition of citizens and smaller associations. These citizens are
ultimately ruled by a unified form of government, notwithstanding the presence of
intermediate groups contributing to the overall social-economic life of society.17 To be sure,
Aristotle’s view was not subsidiary. He notoriously advocated the uniform education of
children, as a function to be properly exercised by the state, not the household. What is more,
much of his analysis of the polis treats it as being comprised of citizens who are not entirely
free but considerably subordinated to the supreme authority of the state.18
Compared to Aristotle’s, Aquinas’s view of the state is much closer to a subsidiarity
role. Aquinas is the paradigm Catholic theorist whose theological approach still underpins the
official doctrine of the Church, especially on the doctrine of natural law. In Aquinas’s Summa
Theologica one finds a penetrating discussion regarding the concept of law within a broader
discussion of natural-law philosophy as well as the overall design of the Creator for the
universe.19 According to Aquinas, the first and foremost principle of law is that ‘good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts are based on this’.20 Whatever
practical reason apprehends something to be ‘good’, this belongs to the precept that
something must be done or at least to not be avoided.21 The opposite shall be true so that, in
their essentials, the precepts of natural law are unchangeable.22 The validity of human law is
therefore dependent on the levels of justice determined by the universal principle that ‘which
is not just seems to be no law at all’. Because ‘the force of a law depends on the extent of its
justice … [i]n human affairs’, Aquinas stated,
… a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the
first rule of reason is the law of nature … Consequently, every human law has just so
Vol. II (Hansebooks, 2016), 111 and 114; see also: William L. Newman, Politics of Aristotle, Vol. III
(Hansebooks, 2016), 130, 132, and 208.
14
Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law (Brooklyn/NY, The Foundation Press, 1953),
338–39.
15
J. H. Abraham, Origins and Growth of Sociology (London/UK: Penguin, 1973), 25.
16
Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 125B15-16, 27-30, 125a15-18.
17
Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 9.
18
Ibid., 9.
19
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, II, Q 93, art 3.
20
Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, 348.
21
Charles E. Rice, 50 Questions on the Natural Law in a Post-Christian Age (San Francisco/CA: Ignatius Press,
1999), 52.
22
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 72, I, II, Q 94, art 5.
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much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it
deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of the law.23
Aquinas is said to promote a synthesis of Aristotelian thought. This leads him to a theology
of social development based on an account of the ‘smaller associations’, with each of these
associations pursuing legitimate and self-sufficient ends. Aquinas sees the ‘smaller
associations’ having their own proper degree of separateness and independence from one
another. He also sees a considerable degree of integration and interdependence of such
associations with the larger communities, particularly the state. There is an undeniable
appreciation of intermediary groups and its grades and jurisdictions. Some of them are
organised into their own graded hierarchies. These associations, from the smallest to the
largest, must be allowed by the state to make unique and special contributions as a means to
achieve human fulfilment. According to Aroney, ‘[t]his idea of a plurality of communities of
a political, ecclesiastical, social and economic nature, themselves composed of smaller
constituent communities, readily suggested the idea of an elective, corporate representation of
the smaller community in the governing institutions of the larger.’24 By proclaiming the
supremacy of natural law over positive laws, some elements in Aquinas’s theory points to a
classical liberal concept of limited government. As Professor Aroney points out, Aquinas
favoured constitutional monarchical rule over authoritarian government:
He was acutely conscious of the propensity of kings to fall into tyranny, and he
suggested several ways in which the authority of the king ought to be tempered,
including the formation of compacts (pacta) which place constitutional limits on his
power, mechanisms by which a tyrannical king can be deposed and systems of ‘mixed
government’ which enable all to have a ‘share’ in ruling’.25
Based on this view, it would be contrary to the character of good governance for the civil
authority ‘to impede people from acting according to their responsibilities – except in
emergencies’. 26 Aquinas reminds us that one of the hallmarks of political tyranny to
completely undermine all forms of solidarity among the people, thus preventing them from
joining in the various compacts and associations whereby the ties of friendship and trust can
be established.27 Therefore, as Aquinas put it, ‘once the king is established, the government
of the kingdom must be so arranged that opportunity to tyrannize be removed. At the same
time his power should be so tempered that he cannot easily fall into tyranny’.28 For Aquinas,
‘man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by the order of justice.
Wherefore if the prince’s authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust,
his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally in order to avoid scandal
or danger’.29 Ultimately, Aquinas stated:
If it is a people’s right to provide itself with a king, and if that king tyrannically abuses
the royal power, there is no injustice if the community deposes or checks him whom
they have raised to the kingship, nor can it be charged with a breach of faith for
abandoning a tyrant, even if the people had previously bound themselves to him in
perpetuity; because, by not faithfully conducting himself in government as the royal
23

Ibid., Q 95.
Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 22.
25
Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principium I.7.1-12 [41-52]; Summa Theologica, I-II, 95.4 and 105.1
26
Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 25.
27
Ibid., 23.
28
Aquinas, De Regimine Principum , Bk I, Ch 2.
29
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II, II, Q 104, art 6.
24
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office demands, he has brought it on himself if his subjects renounce their bargain with
him.30
Above all, the principles of good governance supported by Aquinas are: the supremacy of
legislature over the judiciary; the independence of the judiciary from any form of political
pressure; and the reliance of judges on fixed rules and principles. These, according to him,
are institutional arrangements aiming at the protection of natural rights.31 Above all, wrote
the American Catholic jurist, Charles Rice, ‘Aquinas’ analysis is a prescription for limited
government, providing a rational basis on which to affirm that there are limits to what the
state can rightly do. His insistence that the power of the human law be limited implies a
[natural] right of the person not to be subjected to an unjust law’.32 In this politicalphilosophical perspective, Russell Kirk commented:
natural laws and natural rights and duties all are part of a divine plan for human destiny.
They are the laws and rights and duties that arise from the enduring nature that God has
given to human beings. The Christian believes that human nature does not change: the
character of man in this world always will be what is now, to the end of tie – a mixture
of good and evil. Therefore these natural rights and duties always will endure. It is
better for a man to die than to surrender his natural rights to ignore his natural duties.
And this Christian concept of right and duties lie at the foundation of American society
and government.33
IV. Subsidiarity and the Common Good
In Catholic doctrine social justice is the demand that the common good be realised through
societies, institutions, and groups. This social doctrine, wrote Pope John Paul II, ‘belongs to
the field, not of ideology, but of theology and particularly of moral theology’.34 In this
context, ‘subsidiarity is a principle derivative of social justice, according to which each
member of society is capacitated to perform its social role for the common good’.35 Above
all, this is a principle of non-absorption of lower societies by higher societies, and above all
by the state. Instead, subsidiarity demands that when aid is given to individuals or societies, it
be for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening them.
When naming subsidiarity in Quadragesimo, Pius described it as a ‘most weighty’
(gravissimum) principle of Catholic social doctrine. The Pope also declared it to be a ‘fixed’
(fixum) and ‘unshakable’ (immotumque) principle of the Church. As noted by Patrick
McKinley Brennan, the Catholic Church regards subsidiarity ‘not as a “policy” or a mere
political preference, but instead as one among the unchangeable ontological principles of the
socio-political order’.36 According to this eminent Catholic legal philosopher, subsidiarity
enjoys both positive and negative aspects:
Negatively, it is a principle of non-absorption of lower societies by higher societies,
above all by the state. This is the aspect of subsidiarity that is commonly invoked today,
30

Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, Bk 1, Ch 6.
Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, 350.
32
Charles E. Rice, 50 Questions on the Natural Law: What It Is and Whey We Need It (San Francisco/CA: Ignatius
Press, 1999), 85.
33
Russell Kirk, The American Cause (Wilmington/DE: ISI Books, 2014), 27.
34
Pope John Paul II, Encyclical letter Solicitudo rei socialis (1987) [41] - emphasis original.
35
Patrick McKinley Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, in Global Perspectives
on Subsidiarity, Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (eds.) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 37.
36
Ibid. 31.
31
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but it represents only half the story. Positively, subsidiarity is also the principle that
when aid is given to a particular society, including by the state, it be for the purpose of
encouraging and strengthening that society. 37
The way subsidiarity functions implies that the goal of achieving the common good does not
confer the state any right or authority over what the human person or the communities
(family, church, schools, etc.) can do by their own power. The idea creates no right for the
state beyond its proper limits, emphasising that subsidiarity ‘is inherent in the nature of the
common good’.38 Basically, wrote the celebrated Austrian theologian and social theorist,
Johannes Messner (1891-1984),
the common good principle and the subsidiarity principle are one … The common good
confers powers and at the same time limits them: it empowers them to do everything
necessary for its actual realization, but only that. The common good principle and the
principle of subsidiarity function are two sides of one and the same thing. Thus it was
that Pius XI, when he coined the term “subsidiarity function” called it the “fundamental
principle of social philosophy” … while Leo XIII described the common good principle
as “after God, the first and last law in society.39
More recently, in Centesimus Annus (1991) John Paul II stated that human nature ‘is not
completely fulfilled in the State, but is realised in various intermediary groups, beginning
with the family, including economic, social, political and cultural groups which stem from
human nature itself and have their own autonomy’.40 Subsidiarity means help or assistance,
meaning that higher orders can intervene in the affairs of lower orders insofar as such an
intervention generates ‘auxiliary aids’ and never ‘permanent substitutes’. John Paul II goes
on to remind that the ‘malfunctions and defects’ of the so-called ‘Welfare State’ are the direct
result of an ‘inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the state’.41 And it is precisely
for this reason, wrote John Paul II,
[that] the principle of subsidiarity must be respect[ed] [so that] a community of a
higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower
order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of
need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society,
always with a view to the common good. … In fact, it would appear that needs are
best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them and who act as
neighbours to those in need.42
In keeping with the spirit of the ethnological roots of the word, subsidiarity opposes
centralising, bureaucratising forms of mass welfare assistance by the state, which deprive
citizens of personal responsibility toward themselves, their families, and their societies.
Subsidiarity thus recognises that the best way to achieve the common good is through the
spontaneous interactions between free and responsible citizens. Subsidiarity, therefore, is a
bulwark of limited government, advocating that ‘intermediate social entities can properly
perform the functions that fall to them without being required to hand them over unjustly to

37

Ibid. 35.
Johannes Messner, Social Ethics in the Natural Law Tradition (St Louis/MO: Herder Books Co. 1965), 210.
39
Ibid., 214.
40
Pope John Paul II, Encyclical letter Centesimus Annus (1991) [13].
41
Ibid [48].
42
Ibid.
38
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other social entities of a higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and
substituted, in the end seeing themselves denied their dignity and essential place’.43
V. Solidarity, Subsidiarity, and the Common Good
The functions of morally upright associations exemplify the right of dominion and command
within their respective spheres of autonomy. As Pius XI stated, subsidiarity functions as a
concrete principle, not merely a formal principle. It has content, not just form: it ‘declares a
quite definite distribution of competencies based on the order of being and of ends.’44
According to Brennan, ‘although subsidiarity does not create a social ontology, it discerns
and announces the one ordained by the common good. … It is these genuine authorities, of
course, that Leviathan in all of its successive instantiations wished to vaporize, and the
principle of subsidiary function responds by observing that the vigor and vitality of such
authorities are required by the common good’.45 Thus Brennan also reminds us that the value
of subsidiarity protects the intrinsic, and not merely instrumental, value of associating.
Catholic social doctrine frequently refers to this as ‘solidarity’:
Solidarity highlights in a particular way the intrinsic social nature of the human
person. … Solidarity must be seen above all in its value as a moral virtue that
determines the order of institutions. … Solidarity is also an authentic moral virtue
… a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good.
… Solidarity rises to the rank of fundamental social virtue since it places itself in
the sphere of justice. It is a virtue directed par excellence to the common good.46
Like the ‘lesser’ communities from which they are built, ‘greater’ communities are also
defined by the ‘bonds of interdependence’ – or duties – that arise from the human
relationships that create them47. Thus, as stated by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno (1931),
while ‘the principle [of subsidiarity] operates within a graduated order in which the larger and
higher is superior in authority, and the state is supreme among all’, the measure of duty at
each level is defined by the ‘bonds of interdependence’ that defines its character as a
community: ‘For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help [subsidium] to
the members of the body social ….’48. Robert Cover’s masterful exploration of the Halakhic
(Jewish law) concept of mitzvah49 is especially illuminating here:
When I am asked to reflect upon Judaism and human rights … the first thought
that comes to mind is that the categories are wrong. I do not mean, of course, that
basic ideas of human dignity and worth are not powerfully expressed in the Jewish
legal and literary traditions. Rather, I mean that because it is a legal tradition
Judaism has its own categories for expressing through law the worth and dignity of
43

Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (London/UK: Burns
& Oates, 2005), 94.
44
Messner, Social Ethics in the Natural Law Tradition, 210
45
Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, 40.
46
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 98-9 (emphasis
and internal quotations omitted).
47
Ibid., 98.
48
Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical Letter on Reconstruction of Social Order (May 15, 1931) [79]
(emphasis added).
49
There are three types of mitzvoth: 1) mitzvot d'oraita (Aramaic: "from the Torah"); 2) ormitzvot d'rabbanan
(Aramaic for "from the rabbis"); and 3) a mitzvah that arises from custom (a minhag). In common parlance, the
term “mitzvah” can also refer to any good deed. See Halakha ( ) ָל ָכהֲהin Judaism 101 at
http://www.jewfaq.org/halakhah.htm (last accessed December 14, 2018).
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each human being. And the categories are not closely analogous to “human rights.”
The principal word in Jewish law, which occupies a place equivalent in evocative
force to the American legal system’s “rights”, is the word “mitzvah” which
literally means commandment but has a general meaning closer to “incumbent
obligation.50
Due to these ‘bounds of interdependence’ among all human beings, the foundation of ‘lesser’
communities – families, tribes, unions, towns, cities, churches, etc. – are the crucibles in
which the moral norms of the nations that coalesce around them are elaborated and refined.
Because these moral norms organize the behavior of individuals and associations within these
foundation communities, they must be viewed as an integral aspect of the original rights of
self-governance with which any robust concept of subsidiarity – or of human rights – must be
concerned. Recounting at length the ways in which the modern, central state has moved
relentlessly to supplant the types of private charity that flourish in local communities with a
state-controlled, welfare bureaucracy that grows at the expense of a dynamic exchange
economy, Rev Robert Sirico explains that ‘the largest danger of all’ is the moral hazard
associated with increasing dependence on the state.51
The incumbent obligations arising from these bonds of interdependence define the
nature and character of these communities. From the most fundamental and personal of these
bonds, we deduce the incumbent obligations of spouses, parents, children, and extended
families. As we broaden the scope of social relationships from family to tribe; to
neighborhood; to guild and voluntary association; to city, state, province, and nation-state, we
can see quite clearly why, as Jonathan Chaplin explains, ‘the exercise of a subsidiary function
is itself an act of solidarity’.52 According to Brennan,
Solidarity is never just one thing, but rather the varied ensemble of firm
dispositions that serve the common good by a unity of action for the ends of
particular, upright societies. The meaning of subsidiarity, and solidarity, in
Catholic social doctrine turns on what we mean by society. Subsidiarity require
that the sociality of human beings be preserved and harmonized, and no
argument to benefits external to a particular society itself will prevail, unless
there be moral reason to dissolve the society.53
It follows that unless we have a clear understanding of the ‘incumbent obligations’ assigned
to each of the more broadly-based (‘greater’) communities, it will be impossible to elaborate,
much less to operationalize, the fuller conception of subsidiarity: ‘[A] community of a higher
order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the
latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its
activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good’.54
And yet, as Yves Simon points out, ‘[m]ere partnership does not do anything to put an end to
the solitude of the partners,’55 but in a true society, by contrast, ‘corporate unity is one of the
Robert M. Cover, “Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order”, Journal of Law & Religion 5
(1987): 65.
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reasons for action. Someone leaving a partnership can export his share; the common good of
a society, however, cannot be divided, only shared and participated’. In sum, societies are the
perfecting opportunities for naturally social beings to cause good in others, including through
the supernatural assistance of grace.
VI. Subsidiary Role of the State
Christians cannot discuss the proper role of the state without first acknowledging that every
properly governing order is a divinely ordained structure with multiple tiers of governance
that God established for the benefit of humanity. The reason for such a plurality is simply that
God wishes everyone to be free.56 Since such a plurality provides checks and balances against
the abuse of governmental power,57 tyranny occurs whenever the state goes outside its proper
sphere by ignoring what can be done by the lesser circles of power. Emblematic of such an
approach is the articulation of a political theory whereby societies are allowed to progress
naturally from families through to villages, and, finally, to the state.
The apprehension is that the state is not the only ‘community’; there are also the
family, the church, and numerous other social orders and fraternities.58 This plurality consists
of different spheres of government, each of them having its own limits of responsibility and
jurisdiction. When applied in the context of a federal system, for example, ‘subsidiarity
provides that functions should, where practical, be vested in the lowest level of government
to ensure that their exercise is as close to the people as possible and reflects community
preferences and local conditions’.59 In other words, one should leave to the federal
government only what the local government cannot do in a better or similar way.
Of course, subsidiarity is not a blanket call to strengthen the local power. There might
be things that only the central government can do. However, every government has only
limited responsibilities and we should expect it to accomplish only limited tasks. Besides, as
we know so very well from history, power tends to corrupt and, as Lord Acton famously
stated, ‘[p]ower tends to corrupt, and absolutely power corrupts absolutely’.60 Thus a
government that disperses power is better than one that gathers power into the hands of just a
few. Accordingly, subsidiarity is focused on the auxiliary role of government, implying that
the orders with greatest proximity to the citizen should be prioritized. Implicit in the idea is
the assumption that the local power can perform its activities and services just as efficiently
as a more distant tier of government, if not more so. As noted by law professor Anne
Twomey,
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There is a profound different between authentic freedom and license to do whatever one pleases. When life is
subject to no personal restraint, freedom becomes a mere licence to do as one pleases. Ultimately, freedom
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subsidiarity provides that functions should, where practical, be vested in the
lowest level of government to ensure that their exercise is as close to the people
as possible and reflects community preferences and local conditions … The
principle of subsidiarity places the onus on those who seek to place a function
with a higher level of government to make the case for it.61
VII. Government Responsibilities
Catholic social teaching sees social justice as a primary reason for the existence of civil
government. Justice has been traditionally defined as rendering to each one what is due
according to a right standard. This definition has been epitomised in the Latin motto suum
cuique, which was popularised by Cicero (106-143 BC) in De Nature Deorum (“iustitita
suum cuique distribut” – justice renders to everyone his due) and later codified in the Corpus
Juris Civilis – a collection of fundamental works in jurisprudence, issued from 529 to 534 by
order of Justinian I, Eastern Roman Emperor. Cicero believed that real justice transcends
human expediency because it derives from ‘the same Law, eternal and unchangeable’ enacted
by God, who is ‘its designer, expounder and enactor’ and ‘the universal ruler and governor of
all things’.62 Accordingly, the right standard for justice is found to be derived from principles
of the natural law, which is based on the character of a just and benevolent Creator. This
basic standard insists, among other things, that the innocent shall be protected from
evildoers—rapists, murderers, child molesters, thieves, sex traffickers, dishonest tax
collectors, adulterers, etc. In this context, Cicero famously declared:
The most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is found
in the customs or laws of nations. Would that be true, even if those laws had been
enacted by tyrants? … [or if a law is imposed] that a dictator might put to death
with impunity any citizen he wished, even without a trial. For Justice is one; it
binds all human society, and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied
to command and prohibition … If the principles of justice were found on the
decrees of people, the edicts of principles, or the decisions of judges, then justice
would sanction robbery and adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were
approved by the votes or decrees of the populace.63
The state, as such, has only a limited power. Its ultimate mandate is to preserve the freedom
of the lower social orders (the family, church, etc.) to more properly exercise their roles. Of
course, trusting too much in what the state can do may result in abuse of power. The moral
costs of statism, or excessive governmental intervention, are perhaps in no other field more
visible than in the field of family policy. Although the family serves as a primary means of
acculturation and transmission of values from generation to generation, family ties in today’s
societies are so weak that fewer people think they ought to help their family members. As a
result, people in distress no longer expect to obtain much help this way.64 Rather than
addressing these problems, public policy seems to have further destabilised the family with
disastrous consequences.65
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The last few decades have seen the dramatic proliferation of laws allowing the
unilateral dissolution of the marriage contract. By making divorce easily available and purely
personal, the state has ultimately transformed marriage into a legal absurdity that denies the
doctrine of accountability and holds no inducements to personal misconduct. Since we are all
sinners by nature, these inducements inevitably provide a strong temptation for selfish and
unethical behaviour. Whenever and wherever the family breaks down, of course, the state
must step in as a substitute for the dysfunctional family. Hence the gradual increase of the
state’s jurisdiction over the family and its individual members.66
In Australia, the divorce rates started to climb from the mid-1960s and rose very
sharply following the introduction of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that introduced “nofault” dirvorde. There are tremendous social costs all around when marriages break up. First,
divorce increases economic vulnerability of adults and children, reducing many of them to
poverty and deprivation.67 As noted by Dr Matthew Bambling, a relationship expert and
senior lecturer in medicine at the University of Queensland, although divorce is a primary
source of poverty in Australia, easily available divorce also means that ‘people may be
required to rely in greater part on the social welfare system, [and] there is the potential for
court costs borne through the government-funded system’.68 These family breakdowns
presently cost the Australian economy more than $14 billion a year, with each Australian
taxpayer paying about $1,100 a year to support families in crisis.69 Above all, writes law
professor Patrick Parkinson, ‘fragile families lead to broken hearts. They also threaten the
wellbeing of the community as a whole. Turning this around will require a herculean effort,
but we cannot afford not to make the attempt’.70
By allowing the marriage contract to be easily breached without proper legal
consequences, the state undermined the value we traditionally place on marriage to the
detriment of society as a whole. And yet, it is relevant also to consider how the philosophy of
state interventionism appears to create a profound distortion of the natural order of liberty,
which ultimately affects both private initiative and individual responsibility. This is one of
the reasons as to why the Catechism of the Catholic Church explicitly determines that
‘respect for subsidiarity’ must set ‘the limits for state intervention.’ 71 Ultimately, wrote John
Paul II in Centesimus Annus (1991), ‘the malfunctions and defects in the Social Assistance
State are the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the State.’72 This
understanding was reinforced by Benedict XVI in his first papal encyclical, Deus Caritas Est
(2005):

See: Christopher Brohier and Augusto Zimmermann, “Avoiding Unnecessary Divorce and Restoring Justice
in Marital Separation”, The Western Australian Jurist 6 (2015): 173-194.
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There is no ordering of the State so just that it can eliminate the need for a service
of love. Whoever wants to eliminate love is preparing to eliminate man as such.
There will always be suffering which cries out for consolation and help. There
will always be loneliness. There will always be situations of material need where
help in the form of concrete love of neighbor is indispensable. The State which
would provide everything, absorbing everything into itself, would ultimately
become a mere bureaucracy incapable of guaranteeing the very thing which the
suffering person – every person – needs: namely, loving personal concern.73
The state is made not only of people but of societies formed by them. This plurality of orders
consist of different realms of governance, each having its proper limits of responsibility and
jurisdiction. The first form of government is personal self-government, which is based on the
autonomy of people guided by the natural law of liberty. The family is the next instance of
government naturally instituted by God. The family is the first government in the life of the
child. Finally, there is the state as a political society ordained by God to maintain a right and
just environment where freedom and justice can flourish. In this context, St Paul wrote in his
Epistle to the Romans that the civil authority must be a cause of fear not to those who do
good, but rather to those who practice evil: ‘For government is God's servant working for
your good. But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid. The government does not bear
the sword for no reason. It is God's servant, an avenger to execute God's anger on anyone
who does what is wrong.’ (Romans 13:4)
The Catholic Church sees government as an institution established by God (Genesis
9:6; Romans 13). God ordained the state to practice justice. As long as government serves
the ultimate purpose for which it was established, St Peter instructs: ‘Submit you for the
Lord’s sake to every authority instituted among men, whether to the king, as the supreme
authority, or to governors, who are sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to
commend those who do right’. (1 Peter 2:13–14). Accordingly, subsidiarity is about
establishing the limits for state action, with all the most recent Popes manifesting their clear
opposition to excessive governmental intervention. Benedict XVI, for example, was deeply
concerned about the moral consequences of an all-powerful state ‘which regulates and
controls everything’. Subsidiarity, Benedict stated,
insofar as it encourages men and women to enter freely into life-giving relationships
with those to whom they are most closely connected and upon whom they most
immediately depend, and demands of higher authorities respect for these relationships –
manifests a "vertical" dimension pointing towards the Creator of the social order
(cf. Rom 12:16, 18). A society that honours the principle of subsidiarity liberates people
from a sense of despondency and hopelessness, granting them the freedom to engage
with one another in the spheres of commerce, politics and culture (cf. Quadragesimo
Anno, 80). When those responsible for the public good attune themselves to the natural
human desire for self-governance based on subsidiarity, they leave space for individual
responsibility and initiative, but most importantly, they leave space
for love (cf. Rom 13:8; Deus Caritas Est, 28), which always remains "the most
excellent way" (cf. 1 Cor 12:31). 74
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By constantly interfering in the autonomy of peoples and societies, the state lacks the
capacity to fulfil their most essential functions properly. It will soon be sapped of its own
strength or, alternatively, become totalitarian as it succumbs to the temptation to intervene
not to restore the socio-political order, but to colonise it.75 Jacques Maritain (1882-1973),
arguably the most influential Thomist of the twentieth-century, once observed that the state is
made up not only of people, ‘but particular societies formed by them, and a pluralist body
politic would allow to these societies the greatest autonomy possible and would diversify its
own internal structure in what is typically required by their nature’.76 In this context, the
principle of subsidiarity falsifies the proposition so disastrously implemented by the French
revolutionaries of 1789: ‘It is of necessity that no partial society should exist in the state’. 77
On the contrary, ‘societies are the perfecting opportunities for naturally social beings to cause
good in others, including through the supernatural assistance of grace’.78 As stressed by
Benedict XVI in Deus Caritas Est (2005):
We do not need a State which regulates and controls everything, but a State which, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, generously acknowledges and supports
initiatives arising from the different social forces and combines spontaneity with
closeness to those in need. The Church is one of those living forces: she is alive with
the love enkindled by the Spirit of Christ. This love do not simply offer people material
help, but refreshment and care for their souls, something which often is even more
necessary than material support.79
Statism can offer no promise of salvation, except through the hope that a powerful state will
perfect both the social environment and us. Statism appear therefore to assume that ultimate
salvation can only be achieved collectively. Such a utopian belief in humanity’s perfectibility,
and the perfectibility of the social environment, is based on a profound misconception of
human nature. By contrast, Catholic social theory emphasizes that every person is worthy of
inalienable rights and responsibilities. This is a theme to which Benedict XVI returned time
and again as he addressed a world that ever threatened the lonely individual against the allpowerful state.
VIII. Consequences of Excessive State Intervention
Subsidiarity must be understood as a principle of authentic help or assistance. Since it means
help or assistance, subsidiarity sets the proper limits for state action, implying that higher
orders can intervene in the affairs of lower orders only as auxiliary aids and never as
permanent substitutes. Subsidiarity indicates that state intervention in the internal decisionmaking of private associations is legitimate only insofar as it is designed to protect the rights
that the members of the association have given themselves to participate in its selfgovernance. Because communities are natural outgrowths of human activity, they, like the
individuals who form them, possess, by ‘nature’, original rights of self-governance. That
being so, subsidiarity as a principle cannot be unduly limited by a spatial metaphor or a
general norm of decentralization. Rather, as noted by Chaplin, it should be understood as a
Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, 40.
Jacques Maritain, ‘Integral Humanism’ (1935) in O. Bird (ed.), Integral Humanism, Freedom in the Modern
World, and a Letter of Independence – The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain, - Vol.11, (South Bend/IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p 256.
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natural outgrowth of the social and cultural pluralism that arises when ‘lesser communities
originate from the inclinations of human nature’.80
This is about identifying the moral (and practical) functions to be exercised by the
lower orders, which are essential to the well-functioning of a free society of responsible
individuals. Unfortunately, however, many people are inclined today to look on government
aid as a ‘right’ and thus to regard themselves as entitled to every form of state assistance.
This prevents them from contemplating their own self-worth and, accordingly, from making
attempts to preserve their own self-respect. After describing the moral implications of the
‘modern central state’, Fr Robert Sirico commented:
The welfare state pursues its tasks in terms of a moral code increasingly alien from
traditional Christian tenets. For example, the very concept of a welfare ‘entitlement’
runs contrary to the scriptural understanding of aiding the poor: helping others is a
moral duty that springs from spiritual commitment and is not essentially exercised
through coercion or government mandates. The modern, central state has proven itself
incapable of distinguishing between the deserving and the underserving poor, and
between aid that fosters independence and moral development from that which
reinforces a dependency mindset and moral nihilism. 81
The principle of subsidiarity postulates that is it is not just an administrative inconvenience,
but a ‘grave evil’, to deny people the dignity and authority given to them directly by God.
Although government aid can do some good for those who might need a temporary boost, to
get back on their feet (effectively a Band-Aid for a broken bone), such an assistance should
not eliminate the more pressing moral (and spiritual) needs that lie at the heart of every
dysfunctional behaviour. Sometimes what the recipient of government aid needs is actually a
strong message of work and sobriety. To a great extent, writes Dr Nancy R. Pearcey,
Government aid can actually make things worse. By handing out welfare checks
impersonally to all who qualify, without addressing the underlying behavioural
problems, the government in essence ‘rewards’ antisocial and dysfunctional patterns.
And any behaviour the government rewards will generally tend to increase. As one
perceptive nineteenth century critic noted, government assistance is a ‘might solvent
to sunder the ties of kinship, to quench the affections of family, to suppress in the
poor themselves the instinct of self-reliance and self-respect – to convert them into
paupers.82
Ultimately, Catholic social doctrine teaches very clearly that the malfunctions and defects in
the Welfare State are the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the
state. In Centesimus Annus (1991) one finds the important reminder that human nature ‘is not
completely fulfilled in the State, but is realised in various intermediary groups, beginning
with the family, including economic, social, political and cultural groups which stem from
human nature itself and have their own autonomy’.83 The encyclical goes on to observe that
the ‘malfunctions and defects’ of the Welfare State are the direct result of an ‘inadequate
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understanding of the tasks proper to the state.’84 In that encyclical letter, John Paul II
concluded:
[T]he principle of subsidiarity must be respect[ed] [so that] a community of a higher
order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving
the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to
coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the
common good. … In fact, it would appear that needs are best understood and satisfied
by people who are closest to them and who act as neighbours to those in need.85
But consider however how excessive state intervention stymies people’s ability to provide
financial assistance. When assets are taken from them via excessive levels of taxation, it
leaves very little to donate to private charity. Inseparable from ‘any form of all-encompassing
welfare state’ is a regime of high taxation welfare that diminishes the sphere of free services
by which people can engage in spontaneous activities, thus corroding the culture of civility
that sustains a truly compassionate society. The inevitable result is that an ‘all-encompassing
state’ acquires greater financial power to invest solely in the activities that only the small elite
who controls the state machinery deem worthy to support. According to John Gray:
If, because of the confiscation of higher incomes, there are important social and
cultural activities that can no longer be sustained privately, such as provision for
high culture and the arts, then once again the state assumes responsibility for such
activities through a program of subsidy. Inevitably, the state comes to exercise
ever-increasing degree of control over them. The consequence of redistributionist
policy, accordingly, is the curtailment of private initiative in many spheres of
social life, the destruction of the man of independent means, and the weakening
of civil society.86
In contrast to this, subsidiarity is premised on empowering the citizens with decision-making
carried out as close to them as is viable87 or, in simpler words, at a ‘grassroots level.’88
Subsidiarity presupposes that ‘intermediate social entities can properly perform the functions
that fall to them without being required to hand them over unjustly to other social entities of a
higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and substituted, in the end seeing
themselves denied their dignity and essential place’.89 Thus a hierarchy of social orders is
established, consisting first of the human person as a self-governing entity endowed by God
with inalienable rights to life and liberty. This person is then followed by the family, the local
community, the Church, and, finally, the state. But due to its subsidiary role, however, the
state should not allow other God-ordained institutions (family, church, etc.) the freedom to
perform their roles properly.
In this sense, socialism provides a prime example of the willingness to deny the
ultimate sovereignty of God, and place absolute sovereignty in the hands of a few. Socialism
offers no salvation except through the hope that an all-powerful state can perfect us and our
84
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social environment. While Catholic teaching emphasizes that every person has worth and
responsibility before God, socialism argues that salvation can only be achieved collectively
and ultimately by means of an all-powerful state. Contrary to such a teaching, the Catholic
doctrine stresses the value of human dignity, including personal freedom, and the limits of the
state action.
IX. The Duty to Obey Human Authority
Finally, there is also the important question of obedience to human authority. The duty to
obey authority does not require that we should stray from our ultimate responsibility towards
God; for we are required to obey God even when our reform efforts through political
channels fail. For example, when St Peter and St John were ordered by the Sanhedrin to stop
preaching about Christ, they replied: ‘Judge for yourselves whether it is right in God’s sight
to obey man rather than God’ (Acts 4:19). Based on this historical account, Pope John XXIII
stated in Pacem in Terris (1963):
Since the right to command is required by the moral order and has its source in God, it
follows that, if civil authorities pass laws or command anything opposed to the moral
order and consequently contrary to the will of God, neither the laws made nor the
authorizations granted can be binding on the consciences of the citizens, since God has
more right to be obeyed than men.90
Christ commanded his followers to be the ‘Salt and Light’ of the world. And yet, as Christ
himself put it, salt preserves but if salt loses its saltiness it is worthless (Luke 14:34). This
comment to be ‘salt and light’ is normally called the ‘Great Commission’, meaning that
Christians have the moral duty to serve their fellow humans in every sphere of life, including
law and politics.91 Think, for instance, of the great British politician, William Wilberforce
(1759-1833). ‘God Almighty’, wrote Wilberforce, ‘has set before me two Great Objects: the
suppression of the Slave Trade and the Reformation of Manners’.92 According to his
biographer, Eric Metaxas:
Wilberforce wasn’t just ‘religious’ but actually had a personal relationship with God.
He seems to have been motivated by love—love of God and the love of his fellow
man—more than by a simple sense of right and wrong or justice and injustice. This is
probably the single most important factor in what he was able to do.93
We can only imagine how the world would be if Christians had not fulfilled their ‘Great
Commission’, if they had “privatised” their faith and made no impact on the life of their
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communities. From a Christian perspective all this seems quite natural because the Bible
commands believers to love others as they love themselves. Christians are called to love even
their enemies and to pray for those who persecute them (Matthew 5:44). This command of
unconditional love is ‘a critical foundation of our modern understanding of human dignity
and human rights’.94 In Render Unto Caesar (2008) the Catholic Archbishop of Philadelphia,
Charles J. Chaput, commented that:
For Christians, love is a small word that relentlessly unpacks into a lot of other
words: truth, repentance, forgiveness, mercy, charity, courage, justice. These are
action words, all of them, including truth, because in accepting Jesus Christ, the
Gospel says that we will know the truth, and the truth will make us free (John
8:32)—not comfortable; not respected; but free in the real sense of the word: able
to see and do what’s right. This freedom is meant to be used in the service of
others. Working for justice is an obligation of Christian freedom.95
In our democratic societies, we must hold human authority legally accountable via our active
participation in government—voting, petitioning, running for political office if necessary, or
even serving in non-elected positions where we may be able to influence those in power
(Proverbs 29:2). The Catholic Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith succinctly
explains this fundamental aspect of the Christian faith in the following excerpt from a
doctrinal note:
The social doctrine of the Church is not an intrusion into the government of individual
countries. It is a question of the lay Catholic’s duty to be morally coherent, found
within one’s conscience, which is one and indivisible. There cannot be two parallel
lives in their existence; on the one hand, the so-called ‘spiritual life,’ with its values and
demands; and on the other, the so-called ‘secular’ life, that is, life in a family, at work,
in social responsibilities, in the responsibilities of public life and in culture. The branch,
engrafted to the vine which is Christ, bears its fruit in every sphere of existence and
activity. In fact, every area of the faithful’s lives, as different as they are, enters into the
plan of God, who desires that these very areas be the ‘places in time’ where the love of
Christ is revealed and realised for both the glory of the Father and service of others.
Every activity, every situation, every precise responsibility—as, for example, skill and
solidarity in work, love and dedication in the family and the education of children,
service to society and public life and the promotion of truth in the area of culture—are
the occasions ordained by Providence for a ‘continu[ous] exercise of faith, hope and
Charity’ … Living and acting in conformity with one’s own conscience on questions of
politics is not slavish acceptance of positions alien to politics or some kind of
confessionalism, but rather the way in which Christians offer their concrete
contribution so that, through political life, society will become more just and more
consistent with the dignity of the human person.96
X. Final Considerations
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Zimmermann: Subsidiarity and a Free Society

The Social Doctrine of the Church encourages the development of a fitting pluralistic
democracy promoted by intermediate bodies that are capable of contributing to the attainment
of the common good. In its legitimate authority, the state ought to be limited by a practical
view of the common good.97 When a nation embraces subsidiarity, the state is limited both in
its purpose and its mode of operation and, accordingly, subsidiarity will be a principle of
governance by which the power of the state is limited enough so as to preserve the freedom
of citizens and the lower social orders. Subsidiarity therefore recognises certain aspects of
human life that are naturally ordained by God; that the state cannot not legitimately control.
In this context, ‘State intervention should be characterized by genuine solidarity, which as
such must never be separated from subsidiarity’.98 These are matters associated with
principles that must apply to every conduct, which are matters associated with truly
inviolable rights enjoyed by people and suitably protected by legally-enforceable constraints
on power of various kinds.99
In Catholic social theory, subsidiarity is premised on the affirmation that
‘intermediate social entities can properly perform the functions that fall to them without
being required to hand them over unjustly to other social entities of a higher level, by which
they would end up being absorbed and substituted, in the end seeing themselves denied their
dignity and essential place.’100 Understood in this sense, concludes the Pontifical Council for
Justice and Peace, ‘[s]ubsidiarity … entails a corresponding series of negative implications
that require the State to refrain from anything that would de facto restrict the existential space
of the small essential cells of society. Their initiative, freedom and responsibility must not be
supplanted.’101 A hierarchy of social orders is therefore established, consisting first of the
human person as a self-governing entity and endowed by God with natural rights to life and
liberty, followed by the family, the local community, the Church and, finally, the state. And
since an entity of a higher order must be limited in favour of matters being resolved at the
lowest possible level, assistance by such an order should morally elevate the recipient of aid
and not reinforce an attitude of dependence that offers little incentive for self-responsibility
and discipline.102
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